How can the civil service be reformed to improve its performance?

BUREAUCRATIC reforms have become essential, as a critical constraint today on the effective functioning of government is the budgetary and business cost of its overextended mandate.
Bureaucrats claim to be neutral and disciplined implementers of the demands of the political leadership, blaming the latter for bad decisions and the ‘ills’ of the system. In fact, our government is of civil servants, by civil servants, and for civil servants! They have skilfully deflected attention from the reality that they are a self-perpetuating oligarchy. Anyone of them expounding enlightened views is invariably an ex-civil servant!
As indicated elsewhere in a more detailed piece on civil service reforms by this writer, the government’s institutional architecture has evolved from structures inherited at independence, the constitutional division of subjects between the centre and the provinces, the agencies and positions created by bureaucracy for career progression, political expediency and ad hoc decisions driven by domestic sociopolitical pressures and the conditions laid down by international partners.

The trend has been for structures to grow. It has been relatively easy for new departments, agencies — especially regulatory ones — and staff positions to be created or added. And once established, their continued maintenance is underwritten by stakeholders and system beneficiaries.
More than two dozen entities were created over the years to reform the administrative machinery. However, they concentrated more on issues such as hiring, training, career planning, compensation structures based on perks and privileges, appointments and transfers and redressing grievances. But the failure of these attempts to improve efficiencies resulted in the system essentially remaining dysfunctional.
For example, the outdated system does not prioritise timely action and does not penalise procrastination. The general thinking is that there is unlimited time for delivering on a mandate — with its huge implications for the economy. It is facilitated by the liberal distribution of discretionary powers but there is little accountability.
Some key arguments and proposals regarding civil service reforms are summarised here.
The old systems of governance do not equip bureaucrats with the technical skills to manage policies and operations required by a restructured framework of modern administrative me­­chanisms.

In this age of specialisation, assisted by a wide range of service outsourcing options, a generalist cadre (the PAS/DMG) with non-technical qualifications can be secretary education one week, secretary health the next, and secretary finance the week after, all the while lacking the capability to adapt to changing times and technological advancements. Going forward, structures and skill sets would depend on the types of services to be performed by each level of government.
However, the appropriateness and relevance of functions, rules, and performance evaluation (which is a secretive process), despite the challenges of rapidly changing technological and global environments, a hyperactive media and the growing expectations of a more informed citizenry, are not open for inquiry.
After the 18th Amendment, should there be a PAS/DMG Cadre? The federal government’s role should be restricted to establishing a strategic direction, policymaking and standard-setting in collaboration with the provincial governments under the auspices of the Council of Common Interests. It would then only have a small core with the requisite skills to ensure knowledge and continuity, market-based salaries (abandoning the existing disincentivising unified pay structure) for broadly similar skills, but without perks such as cars, housing, etc.

Having a trimmed Islamabad bureaucracy will also improve efficiency, simply through a reduction in the number of layers of processing. Further gains can also come from the digitalised elimination of unnecessary tasks and by closely aligning functions and resources, appropriately complemented by delegation and decentralisation.
Henceforth, inductees to the generalist cadre should be required, say within eight years of service, to specialise in a subject of their own choosing and acquire the relevant domain knowledge for continuation of service. To this end, there should be an entrance exam administered by a central entity on subjects prioritised by the government’s agenda and entrusted, under the Constitution, to the federal government or to the relevant provincial government or local bodies. This will also enable a more realistic performance evaluation.
Moreover, an opportunity for lateral entry should be open to all positions (with no reservations of posts for any group/cadre) to induct, on a contractual basis, high-quality professionals who possess rapidly evolving technological knowhow and skills.
Furthermore, we should embrace a contributory pension system for new entrants to the civil service. It should be adopted for existing employees, protecting pension entitlements attained to date.
The additional cash expenditures on the monetisation of benefits and the adoption of the contributory pension scheme — this might require an enhancement in salary — can be financed from resources released from the trimming of the federal and provincial governments, the liquidation/closing down of several organisations and the disposal of prime commercial land held by government and used for offices and the housing of civil and judicial bureaucracies, along with the money that will be saved on a recurrent basis for not having to maintain these properties and the cars funded from the public purse.

This can make the compensation package more transparent and give the employee a choice in, for example, spending more on his child’s education rather than residing in a palatial house. It will also expose employees to the socioeconomic stresses faced by ordinary citizens.
To enable a speedier shift to monetisation the government can a) help them lease their cars and compensate the use of the private car for official business under the present rules; b) cover their health needs through insurance.
In line with the above proposals and those in the earlier article each tier of government and relevant ministry should be independent in designing policies for mandated functions through its own employees and own pay structure, based on market valuation for the required skills and experience, using a sensible list of comparators for benchmarking. This structure will need to be complemented by credible systems of oversight and accountability.
The writer is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.
Published in Dawn, October 31st, 2024